Program Overview

---

QSS 30.04: Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications

Course Description

The course introduces basic concepts in evolutionary game theory, including evolutionarily stable strategies, replicator dynamics, finite populations, and games on networks, along with applications to social evolution, particularly to understanding human cooperation.

Prerequisites

• Math 3
• Familiarity with calculus, basic concepts in ordinary differential equations, and probability
• Programming skills are helpful but not required

Suggested Textbooks

• Nowak, M. A. (2006). Evolutionary dynamics. Harvard University Press.
• Sigmund, K. (2010). The calculus of selfishness. Princeton University Press.

Grading Formula

• Attendance & Participation (20%)
• Homework Problem Sets (40%)
• Final Project + 15m Presentation (40%)

Instructor and Course Details

• Instructor: Professor Feng Fu, Mathematics Department, Dartmouth College
• Course Time: 2A TuThu 2:25pm-4:15pm (x-hour Wed 4:35pm-5:25pm) at 028 Haldeman Center

Important Dates

• Final project proposal due on: 1 February 2018
• Homework problem sets due biweekly
• Final project presentations: in the week of 1 March (week 9)
• Final project report (written in a research paper form) due on: 9 March 2018
• Course withdrawal deadlines:
  • 12 February 2018: Final day for dropping a 4th course
  • 20 February 2018: Final day to withdraw from a course

Syllabus

Tentative lecture plan which may be subject to further changes.

Lecture Plan

Week | Lecture | Readings
---|---|---
Lec 1 | Evolutionary Games: Introduction & Overview | Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2004). Evolutionary dynamics of biological games. Science, 303(5659), 793-799.
Lec 2 | Stability Concepts: Nash Equilibrium vs. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy |
Lec 3 | Replicator Equations and Its Connection with Ecological Dynamics |
Lec 4 | Social Dilemmas of Cooperation | Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology, 183-214.
Lec 5 | Rules for Cooperation | Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 314(5805), .
Lec 6 | Repeated Games | Binmore, K. G., & Samuelson, L. (1992). Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata. Journal of Economic Theory, 57(2), 278-305.
Lec 7 | Beyond Pairwise Interactions: Multi-Person Games | Hardin, G., (1998) Extensions of "the tragedy of the commons". Science, 280(5364): 682-683.
Lec 8 | Spatial Games | Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359(6398), 826-829.
Lec 9 | Adaptive Dynamics | Dieckmann, U., & Law, R. (1996). The dynamical theory of coevolution: a derivation from stochastic ecological processes. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 34(5-6), 579-612.
Lec 10 | Evolutionary Branching | Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003). Evolutionary game dynamics. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 40(4), 479-519.
Doebeli, M., Hauert, C., & Killingback, T. (2004). The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors. Science, 306(5697), 859-862.
Lec 11 | Finite Populations I | Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004). Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature, 428(6983), 646-650.
Traulsen, A., Claussen, J. C., & Hauert, C. (2005). Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations. Physical Review Letters, 95(23), .
Lec 12 | Finite Population II |
Lec 13 | Evolutionary Graph Theory | Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2005). Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature, 433(7023), 312-316.
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature, 441(7092), 502-505.
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010). Coevolutionary games--a mini review. BioSystems, 99(2), 109-125.
Lec 14 | Vaccination Dilemma | Bauch, C. T., & Earn, D. J. (2004). Vaccination and the theory of games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 101(36), .
Lec 15 | Evolutionary Dynamics of In-group Favoritism | Masuda, N., & Fu, F. (2015). Evolutionary models of in-group favoritism. F1000Prime Reports, 7, 27.
Lec 16 | Evolution of Homophily | Fu, F., Nowak, M.A., Christakis, N.A., & Fowler, J.H.(2012) The evolution of homophily. Scientific reports, 2: 845.
Week 9 | Final Project Presentations | TBD

Course Projects and Presentation Schedule

Projects

Approximately 4 weeks are given to complete the project. The instructor will suggest project ideas in the third week, but you are allowed to propose your own, which has to be approved by the instructor in the fourth week at the latest. Each project presentation is limited to 15 minutes and preferably in the style of TED talks.

Presentation Schedule

Course projects are listed in the alphabetical order of student names, and will be updated once more progresses are made by the students.

Name | Project Title
---|---
Sahil Abbi & Sean K. McGowan | Social Dilemma of Land Privatization
Alexander C. Beals & Kyu Hyeon Kim | An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to Flu Vaccination Dynamics
Wei Liang Samuel Ching & Bruno Korbar | Exploring winning strategies in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma using reinforcement learning algorithms
Madison M. Hazard & Tsz Ki Lit | Virulence and Tragedy of the Commons
Jared E. Hodes & Jakob Y. Stern | Cooperation and Incentives in Cryptocurrency Mining
Kevin Hu | Social Networks: Framework Structures that Champion the Distribution of Fake News
Heyi Jiang | Refugee crises through the lens of evolutionary game theory
Cindy Li & Alma Wang | Understanding betta fish fighting and mating behavior
Derek H. Lue & William L. Synnott | The Altruistic Balanced Paired Kidney Exchange: Evolutionary Game Theory as a Model to Determine the Value of Human Altruism
Trent B. Shillingford | Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Adoption
Dogukan B. Yucel | Population Dynamics of Extremist Ideologies -- Replicator Dynamics with Game-Social Environment Feedback

Course Policies

Honor Principle

Collaborations (giving and receiving assistance) during closed-book exams and quizzes are strictly prohibited. Any form of plagiarism is not allowed in the final project.

Accessibility Policy

Students with learning, physical, or psychiatric disabilities enrolled in this course that may need disability-related classroom accommodations are encouraged to make an office appointment to see your instructor before the end of the second week of the term.

Student Religious Observances

Some students may wish to take part in religious observances that fall during this academic term. Should you have a religious observance that conflicts with your participation in the course, please come speak with your instructor before the end of the second week of the term to discuss appropriate accommodations.

Late Policy

By "deadline" we really mean it. On the condition of accepting the penalty for turning in the final project report late (that is, 5% each additional day), however, an extension of maximum 4 days will be granted on a case-by-case basis. In exceptional circumstances, students with disabilities should inform the instructor of their accommodation requests well in advance, so that the instructor will have sufficient time to work with Student Accessibility Services to provide appropriate accommodations.